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A new approach to constructing generalised probabilities is proposed. It is based on the
models using lower and upper previsions, or equivalently, convex sets of probability mea-
sures. Our approach uses sets of Markov operators in the role of rules preserving desirability
of gambles. The main motivation being the operators of conditional expectations which are
usually assumed to reduce riskiness of gambles. Imprecise probability models are then ob-
tained in the ways to be consistent with those desirability preserving rules. The consistency
criteria are basedon the existing interpretations ofmodels using imprecise probabilities. The
classical models based on lower and upper previsions are shown to be a special class of the
generalised models. Further, we generalise some standard extension procedures, including
the marginal extension and independent products, which can be defined independently of
the existing procedures known for standard models.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Lack of precision in probability distributions ismodelled in a very convenientway by the use of lower an upper previsions
[12,22,23], which turn out to coincide with the lower and upper expectations with respect to sets of finitely additive
probabilities. Another, equivalent way to arrive to the same implications is through sets of desirable gambles, i.e. those
random gambles that a decision maker is willing to accept.
Additional assumptions, such as risk aversion, are often imposed on the sets of desirable gambles. This means that a
risk averse decision maker is supposed to always accept a gamble that is less risky than some desirable gamble. It has been
shown previously in literature [3,18,24] that such additional assumptions imply interesting properties to the corresponding
imprecise probability models.
The aim of this paper is to generalise the existing models of imprecise probabilities to allow imposing such additional
requirements. The generalised model allows combining various assumptions and, as a result, constructing imprecise proba-
bilitymodels consistent with those assumptions. The classical approach can then be considered a special case. Moreover, we
give procedures for extending the models to larger domains that generalise the most common existing extension methods.
In particular, we generalise the method of natural extension, marginal extension and independent products.
As an important motivation for this approach we study conditional expectations as operators on linear spaces of real
valued maps. Our method then provides a more general description of some known methods for modelling risk aversion
with imprecise probabilities. Moreover, we propose a more general model that seems to allow a new unified approach to
modelling risk and uncertainty aversion.
The paper has the following structure. In the next section we repeat the most basic theory of imprecise probability
models. In Section 3we analyse the conditional expectation operators as themainmotivation for introducing sets ofMarkov
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operators as means for constructing of imprecise probabilities. In Section 4 the model based on sets of Markov operators
is described, and based on existing interpretations, consistency rules between sets of operators and the corresponding
imprecise probability models are defined. As an application, in Section 4.4 a possible unified approach to modelling risk and
uncertainty aversion is described. In Section 5 we give two basic results on extensions of sets of operators which generalise
knownresults fromthe theoryof impreciseprobabilities.Another important constructionused toextendprobabilisticmodels
to larger spaces are independent products, which we generalise to sets of operators using tensor products in Section 6.
2. Elements of imprecise probability theory
The theory of imprecise probabilities, as proposed by Walley [22,23], is based on subjective Bayesian interpretation of
probability. Here we will repeat the basic elements of this theory. For a more detailed survey, see e.g. [12].
Let X be a non-empty set denoting all possible results of an experiment. If not explicitly stated otherwise, throughout
this paper the setX will be assumed to be finite. Although, some concepts, such as conditional expectationwill be explained
in the more general settings of infinite spaces.
A gamble denotes a mapping X : X → R which represents rewards if a certain element of X happens to be the result
of the experiment. Unless explicitly stated differently, we will assume that rewards are measured in linear utility scale. The
set of all gambles on X will be denoted by L (X ), or often just L . Often not all gambles are of interest, in which case we
restrict to some subset K of L . Particularly, in this paper we will only restrict to the sets that are linear subspaces of L ,
which means subsets closed for addition and multiplication with real numbers.
For ranking of gambles we will use the following notation: X ≥ Y means that X(x) ≥ Y(x) for every x ∈ X , and X > Y
means that X(x) ≥ Y(x) for every x ∈ X and X(x) > Y(x) for at least one x ∈ X .
A crucial consideration is which gambles are acceptable or desirable for a decision maker, that is, the gambles that the
decisionmaker is willing to accept. There are several slightly different notions of desirability (see [12]). In this paper wewill
work exclusively with the notion that is called almost desirability in the above reference. A set of almost desirable gambles D
is a closed convex set that contains all sure gains, i.e. gambles X such that X(x) ≥ 0 for every x ∈ X ; and no sure losses, i.e.
the gambles X such that X < 0. Further, for every λ ≥ 0 and X ∈ D it must hold that λX ∈ D . Since there is no danger for
confusion, we will use the terms desirable and almost desirable gamble as synonyms.
A pair of real values P(X) and P(X) is assumed for each gamble X , called the lower and the upper prevision respectively,
and interpreted as the supremum acceptable buying price and the infimum acceptable selling price respectively. They are
defined using the set of desirable gambles as follows. Given a gamble X , its lower prevision is defined as
P(X) = sup{μ : X − μ ∈ D}. (1)
Equivalently, given a lower prevision P, the corresponding set of almost desirable gambles is characterised with
D = {X : P(X) ≥ 0}.
In general P(X) ≤ P(X) holds; however, if equality holds for every X ∈ L , then we are talking about a linear prevision. In
the case of a finite space, every linear prevision can be represented by a probability mass function p so that P(X) = Ep(X) =∑
x∈X p(x)X(x).
A lower prevision P on a linear space of gambles K , which may be a proper subset of L , is called coherent whenever it
satisfies the following axioms:
(P1) P(X) ≥ minX X for all X ∈ K (accepting sure gains);
(P2) P(λX) = λP(X) for any X ∈ K and λ > 0 (positive homogeneity);
(P3) P(X + Y) ≥ P(X) + P(Y) for all X, Y ∈ K (superlinearity).
If P is a coherent lower prevision, then the corresponding upper prevision can be obtained as P(X) = −P(−X). Therefore it
is enough to focus on lower previsions only.




where the minimum is taken over the set of all linear previsions on the space L of all gambles on X , and P|K denotes
the restriction of the linear prevision P to K . The setM (P) = {P : P|K ≥ P} of linear previsions or, equivalently, finitely
additive probabilities, is called the credal set of P. Every linear prevision can be equivalently represented as the expectation
functional Ep with respect to a probability measure p. Therefore credal sets are sometimes described as sets of (finitely
additive) probability measures. (Of course, in the finite case finite additivity coincides with σ -additivity.)
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defined for every X ∈ L , is called the natural extension of P. The natural extension is the uniquemost conservative coherent
extension of a lower prevision to the domain of all gambles onX .
If P and P′ are two lower previsions such that P(X) ≥ P′(X) holds for every gamble X , thenwe say that P ismore committal
than P′. This is because P commits to accepting more gambles than P′. Equivalently, P is more committal than P′ if and only
ifM (P) ⊆ M (P′).
Although the linear previsions in a credal set M (P) are usually assumed to be defined on the whole L , even if the
corresponding lower prevision P is only defined on a proper subsetK , wewill sometimes need to restrict it toK . As follows
from [22, Theorem 3.4.2], provided thatK = −K , every linear prevision P ≥ P onK has an extension to thewholeL that
is contained inM (P), and obviously also the restriction of any linear prevision P ∈ M (P) toK is a linear prevision onK that
dominates P. Therefore we have a one-to-one correspondence between the sets of all linear previsions on L dominating P
onK and the sets of all linear previsions onK dominating P. This implies that the restrictionMK (P) = {P|K : P ∈ M (P)}
is indeed equal to the set of all linear previsions onK dominating P. We will therefore say thatMK (P) is the credal set of
P onK .
There is a one-to-one correspondence between coherent lower previsions defined on the space of all gambles and closed
convex sets of probabilities. Every closed convex set of probabilities is therefore a credal set of a coherent lower prevision. For
this reason we use the term credal set to denote any closed convex set of linear previsions or, equivalently, finitely additive
probabilities.
In our analysis we will often use the following easy consequences of the definitions of lower and upper previsions:
(P4) P(a1X ) = P(a1X ) = a, where 1X denotes the constant map: 1X (x) = 1 for every x ∈ X and a is an arbitrary
constant;
(P5) P(X + a1X ) = P(X) + a (constant additivity).
3. Conditional expectation as a desirability preserving Markov operator
In this sectionwedescribe theproperties of conditional expectation,which is often considered as anoperator that reduces
risk, but preserves expectations. Decision makers that among the gambles with the same expectations prefer the less risky
ones are said to be risk averse. One of the main motivations of this paper is modelling risk aversion with operators similar
to, but more general than conditional expectation. As conditional expectation is usually defined on non-finite sets, we will
temporarily omit the finiteness assumption, which, besides posing unnecessary constraints, would not essentially simplify
the reasoning. Moreover, we will refer to earlier results where this role of conditional expectation was related to imprecise
probability models, where similarly we did not assume finiteness either.
The comparison of gambles with respect to their riskiness usually assumes a probability space with a fixed (precise)
probability distribution (see [15,4]). Even though in suchmodels there is no imprecision involved in the sense of an unknown
probability distribution, credal sets, also called sets of priors, are a convenient way to model risk aversion, as demonstrated
by Chateauneuf [3] or recently Werner [24]. Such credal sets then often arise as neighbourhoods of the assumed precise
probability models. Some properties of such neighbourhoods are also described in [19].
Wewill show in the sequel why conditional expectations can be considered risk reducing operators, and consequently as
desirability preserving operators. However, for generalised desirability preserving operators we will no longer assume any
precise probability used to form conditional expectation, or any other relation with a precise probability model. Instead of
that we will only assume some basic conditions which every desirability preserving operator should satisfy. In a sense, sets
of such operators will then generalise credal sets. Another example showing that desirability preserving operators should
not be restricted to conditional expectations only, comes from the modelling of symmetry [13]. We will describe it later
in this section. In general, except for the purpose of motivation, we will not assume any particular interpretation of the
desirability preserving operators. Our purpose is instead to show that it is always possible to derive imprecise probability
models compatible with the sets of operators, although not always uniquely.
Let us now start with defining conditional expectation. The proofs of general results for conditional expectations and
Markov operators that we use here can be found in [2]. Let p be a probability measure on a probability space (X ,A ) and
B ⊂ A a subalgebra or a finite partition. Further, let X : X → R be an A -measurable map. Then conditional expectation






X(x) dp(x) for every B ∈ B,
and in particular,
Ep(Ep(X|B)) = Ep(X). (3)
1 Almost everywhere unique means that any two conditional expectations coincide everywhere except on a set with measure (probability) 0.
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where B is the atom inB containing x and p(·|B) is the conditional probability given B. A conditional expectation thus maps
a real-valued function into a function that is averaged on each atom B ∈ B.
In order to demonstrate that conditional expectation of a gamble is indeed less risky than the gamble itself, we will use
Jensen’s inequality, which says that for any concave real-valued map u and every A -measurable X : X → R and such that
u(X) is integrable, we have that
u(Ep(X|B)) ≥ Ep(u(X)|B). (4)
When preferences between gambles are modelled using expected utility, i.e. X is preferred to Y if Ep(u(X)) ≥ Ep(u(Y)),
then risk aversion is expressed with concave utility function. A gamble Y with the same mean as X : Ep(Y) = Ep(X) and
Ep(u(Y)) ≥ Ep(u(X)) for every concave utility function u is said to second order stochastically dominate X (see e.g. [1,15]),
which we denote Y 2 X . Thus, if Y 2 X then every risk averse decision maker would prefer Y over X . We use (3) and (4)
to obtain
Ep(u(X)) = Ep(Ep(u(X)|B)) ≤ Ep(u(Ep(X|B))),
which shows that the conditional expectation Ep(X|B) second order stochastically dominates X and should then be consid-
ered less risky than X .
The conditional expectation operator is linear and has the following properties:
1. if X ≤ Y then E(X|B) ≤ E(Y |B) (monotonicity);
2. Ep(1X |B) = 1X .
Every conditional expectation operator therefore belongs to the following more general class of linear operators.
Definition 1. Let T : H → K be a linear operator whereH and K are linear spaces of gambles on X that both contain
all constant gambles. If T is monotone, i.e. TX ≤ TY whenever X ≤ Y , and T1X = 1X then it is called aMarkov operator or
a stochastic operator.
Some further properties of conditional expectations follow from the fact that, as projections on the space L2(X ,A , p) of
square integrable real-valued functions, they are self adjoint operators. Thismeans the following. LetX andY ∈ L2(X ,A , p).
Then we have that
Ep(Ep(X|B)Y) = Ep(XEp(Y |B)).
In particular, let hq be a density function of a probability measure q 	 p, which denotes that q is absolutely continuous with
respect to p, i.e. q(A) = 0 for every A ∈ A such that p(A) = 0 (see [16]). Then hq is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of qwith
respect to p. We have that
Eq(Ep(X|B)) = Ep(Ep(X|B)hq) = Ep(XEp(hq|B)) = Eq˜X, (5)
where q˜ denotes the probability measure whose Radon-Nikodym derivative with respect to p is the conditional expectation
Ep(hq|B).
Thus, calculating expectations with respect to any probability q 	 p of the conditional expectation Ep(X|B) is the same
as calculating expectations of X with respect to q˜. The way how probability q˜ is obtained is also known as Jeffrey’s rule of
conditioning. This rule updates a probability measure pwith the new information about the probabilities of events in some
subalgebra B, which is expressed through a probability q|B. In the case where B = {B, Bc}, q(B) = 1 and q(Bc) = 0 this
coincides with conditioning on the event B (see [10,19]).
In the following we make use of the approach taken by Chateauneuf [3] and Werner [24], who propose that even in the
settings of precise probabilities credal sets, which in this case form a neighbourhood of the precise probability, can be used
to modelling risk aversion. Let X be an acceptable gamble (in the case of a non finite space a gamble nowmeans a bounded
and measurable real map) and suppose that p is the assumed true probability. Then, if risk aversion is assumed, Ep(X|B)
should be considered acceptable as well. Now letM be the credal set modelling the preference relation over the set of all
gambles, i.e. a gamble X is preferred to Y if and only if 2
min
q∈M EqX ≥ minq∈M EqY . (6)
2 This definition is standard for modelling risk and uncertainty aversion [3,9,24]; however, there are other ways how a preference relation between gambles
can be defined. For a survey see [17]. Se also discussion in Section 4.2.
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We assume that for every acceptable gamble X its conditional expectation Ep(X|B) is also acceptable, for every subalgebra
B ⊆ A . Further we also assume that every q ∈ M has Radon-Nikodym derivative with respect to p, which implies the
existence of the corresponding q˜with the property (5). Then we have that
min
q∈M Eq(Ep(X|B)) = minq˜ : q∈M Eq˜X ≥ minq∈M EqX.
The above equation implies that every q˜ must belong toM as well, or equivalently, thatM must be closed with respect to
Jeffrey’s conditioning. This result is previously known from literature (see [19,24] for the finite case).
The purpose of this paper is to derive similar consistency rules for more general sets of Markov operators. The idea is the
following. Given a setT ofMarkov operators that preserve the set of desirable gambles, we derive consistency requirements
for the credal sets that model such preferences. More about the conditions for credal sets compatible with certain sets of
operatorswill be explained in the sequel. Let us first explainwhy the choice that the desirability preserving operators should
have the properties of Markov operators seems reasonable. The requirement that T1X = 1X for such an operator is very
natural and immediately implies that TaX = aX for every constant a. On the other hand, monotonicity together with
linearity is clearly equivalent to requiring that sure gains are preferred to gaining nothing, i.e. the zero gamble, which is
also one of the key requirements for making sensible decisions. We do not impose any additional restrictions; moreover, we
will prove that every set of operators having these properties is compatible with some imprecise probability models, and
consequently can be considered a desirability preserving set of operators.
In the case of risk aversion, the existence of the “true” probability measure p is assumed, and the set of desirability
preserving operators then consists of all conditional expectation operators with respect to p on all subalgebrasB ⊆ A . An
immediate step forward is the following more general question. What if instead of having a single probability measure p a
set of probabilities is givenwhich can all be assumed as candidates for the “true” probability? Can a decisionmakermake his
preferences in such a way that no matter which of them happens to be the true probability, his preferences will exhibit risk
aversion? To satisfy such a requirement, he would prefer all gambles of the form Ep(X|B) to X , where p is any probability
measure from the given set andB any subalgebra ofA . Clearly, we would then have a larger set of conditional expectations
with respect to different probabilities and subalgebras. We will propose a solution to this problem in Section 4.4.
3.1. Other examples of desirability preserving operators
A related problem was studied by de Cooman and Miranda [5], where they consider a set of mappingsX → X , which
is usually a semigroup, i.e. closed for compositions. They expand considerably the work started by Walley [22, Section 3.5].
Every such transformation T : X → X is then lifted to a transformation Tt : L → L by defining TtX(x) = X(Tx). Clearly
Tt is a Markov operator. In the case where T is bijective, we call the operator Tt a permutation operator. The importance of
permutation operators in relationwith imprecise probabilities is the following. Suppose that a decisionmaker has symmetric
information about occurrence of each state in a finite set X . This does not mean that he believes that they are all equally
likely, but only that no information is available that would suggest some states being more likely than other. This would
suggest that any gamble that is obtained by only rearranging values of some desirable gamble X would be desirable as well.
De Cooman and Miranda call this weak invariance. These considerations are then the basis to define symmetry of models of
imprecise probabilities. The convex closure of the set of permutation operators is the set of doubly stochastic operators. With
a similar underlying idea Kadane and Wasserman [11] involved doubly stochastic operators to studying upper and lower
probabilities with the purpose to generalise the concept of uniform probability models.
4. Sets of Markov operators
LetK be a linear space of gambles and, as said before, we will assume that every set of gambles that we work with is a
linear space. Wewill denote the set of all Markov operators onK withS (K ). Therefore every set of desirability preserving
operatorsT will be a subset ofS (K ), andwewill additionally assume that every such set is closed. Nowwe investigate how
sets of Markov operators can be related to imprecise probability models. In particular, wewill first show that a set of Markov
operators can naturally be assigned to any imprecise probabilitymodel via its credal set. After thatwewill define how sets of
Markov operators and imprecise probabilitymodels can be compatible, and show that also conversely, compatible imprecise
probability models can be assigned to every set of operators, although not necessarily uniquely.
4.1. Credal sets as sets of desirability preserving operators
Consider a general probabilistic model given by a coherent lower prevision P on a linear set of gambles K , the corre-
sponding credal setM (P) and the corresponding set of almost desirable gambles D . Assume also that the set K contains
all constant gambles. For every desirable gamble X ∈ D and every linear prevision P ∈ M (P) we have that P(X) ≥ 0, or
equivalently that the gamble P(X)1X is almost desirable. Therefore, the mapping
TP : X 
→ P(X)1X (7)
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that maps all gambles in K to constant gambles preserves desirability. The credal setM (P) can thus be identified with a
set of desirability preserving operators
TP = {TP : P ∈ M (P)} (8)
whose range is the set of constant gambles. Moreover, we have that a gamble is desirable if and only if TPX is a desirable
gamble for every P ∈ M (P). The construction of the corresponding set of desirable gambles when all desirability preserving
operators are constant is then obvious because of the clear cut between desirable and undesirable constant gambles. Having
a set of desirability preserving operators whose images are not necessarily constant gambles can therefore be considered a
generalisation of the concept of a credal set.
Now consider a more general set of desirability preserving operators T , i.e. we no longer assume that TX is a constant
gamble for every T ∈ T and X ∈ K . Using only this information is in general not enough to construct the corresponding set
of desirable gambles uniquely, since there is no general way to judge desirability of the gamble TX . However, it is possible
to derive, in general a class of, compatible probabilistic models and, in particular, the one with the smallest set of desirable
gambles; and in some particular cases also the one with the largest such set. The corresponding coherent lower previsions
are then respectively the least and the most committal lower previsions compatible with the set of operators.
The way how sets of desirability preserving operators can be used might then be one of the following. We could first
start with a set of gambles that are judged desirable and then use the set of operators to construct new desirable gambles.
Then we might, for instance, have a set of desirability preserving operators mapping from a space H to a subspace K
of H . In the case when desirability of all gambles in K has been evaluated beforehand, this information would allow
evaluating desirability of gambles in H . As a particular example consider the case where we have evaluated desirability
of all B-measurable gambles for some partition B of X . A set of conditional expectations {Ep(·|B) : p ∈ M } for some set
of probabilities is then considered as a set of desirability preserving gambles. A gamble X on X is then judged desirable if
Ep(X|B) is desirable for every p ∈ M . There are of course more possible ways how to use the information given by a set of
desirability preserving gambles; though, we will focus more on general properties of probabilistic models compatible with
given sets of desirability preserving operators, and on the ways how to combine such sets and how are such combinations
related with the combinations of the compatible probabilistic models.
4.2. Consistency requirements
Now consider a set of desirability preserving operators T and a probabilistic model given equivalently by specifying a
lower prevision P or the set of desirable gambles D or the corresponding credal setM (P). We will now give the consistency
properties that should relate the set T with the probabilistic model. The basic motivation to have desirability preserving
operators suggests the following basic consistency requirement:
Definition 2. A set of desirable gambles D is consistent with a set of Markov operators T if TX ∈ D for every X ∈ D and
every T ∈ T .
It is an immediate consequence that the set of desirable gambles D is closed for T : T D ⊆ D . In [5] such property is
called weak invariance.
Observe that the above notion of consistency implies that for every gamble X and every operator T ∈ T , the gamble
TX − μ = T(X − μ) is desirable for every μ such that X − μ is desirable. This immediately implies that the supremum
buying price for TX is greater or equal to the supremum buying price of X . Since the supremum buying price is equal to
the lower expectation with respect to the corresponding credal set, then TX if preferred to X using the preference order (6),
called -maximin order by Troffaes [17]. 3
Walley [22, 3.8.1] suggests a different order called themaximality decision rule by Troffaes, where a gamble X is preferred
to Y if the gamble X − Y is desirable. Let us argue why maximality rule would be too strong for the type of model that
we propose. If we would accept the maximality decision rule then TX − X would be a desirable gamble for every gamble
X and every operator T . Consider, for instance, a lower prevision P and the corresponding set of constant operators TP .
Take some TP ∈ TP and a gamble X . If we would require that TPX − X = P(X)1X − X is desirable, this would mean that
0 ≤ P(TPX−X) = P(X)+P(−X) = P(X)−P(X), whichwould only be possible if P(X) = P(X), and thiswould have to hold
for every P ∈ M (P) and every gamble X in the domain of P. Hence, we would in fact have a precise probability model. This
is also in a way one of the findings in [5]. More precisely, they prove that the only model of symmetry on a finite space X
is the uniform (precise) probability model, which should only be used when there is evidence for symmetry, i.e. that every
state inX is equally probable, but not in the case where we have a symmetry of evidence, i.e. that we have a symmetry of
information about how likely the states are.
Consistencyhowever isnot enough toproduce sensiblemodels, since the setof all non-negativegambles inK is consistent
with any set of operators T . Now consider again the set of operators TP , where P is some coherent lower prevision, and the
3 In fact Troffaes defines the -maximin order using the minimum expected utilities; however, if linear utility scale is assumed, this corresponds to the notion
used here.
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corresponding set of desirable gambles D . Consistency in this case represents the fact that for every desirable gamble X the
value TPX is non-negative for every P ∈ M (P). But the probabilistic model also implies that for every non-desirable gamble
X there is at least one P ∈ M (P) such that TPX < 0, i.e. is undesirable. This has an obvious generalisation to general sets of
operators:
Definition 3. A set of desirable gambles D dominates a set of Markov operators T if TX ∈ D for every T ∈ T implies that
X ∈ D .
In other words, a set of desirable gambles D dominates T if for every non-desirable gamble X , i.e. X ∈ D , there must be
at least one T ∈ T such that TX ∈ D .
Now observe that the set of desirable gambles D corresponding to a lower prevision P is the unique set that both is
consistent with TP and dominates it. This suggests the following generalisation.
Definition 4. A set of desirable gambles D is generated by T if it both is consistent with and dominates T .
Remark 1. It should be noted that the condition of consistency of a set of desirable gambleswith a set ofMarkov operators is
sufficient when it is used as a criterion of compatibility of probabilistic model with given desirability preserving operators.
However, when a set of operators is used to construct a probabilistic model it should be combined with the criterion
of dominance. In the first case it is implicitly assumed that other considerations have also been taken into account when
constructing the probabilisticmodel, while in the second case the sets of operators should be assumed to contain all relevant
information available for constructing the probabilistic model.
A situation where desirability preserving operators provide only a complementary information would be, for instance,
when the set of desirable gambles is already partially specified and the operators are then used to complete it by adding
to it all gambles of the form TX , where X is a desirable gamble and T a desirability operator. A very simple example would
be when a precise probability model is assumed. Then every risk averse decision maker would accept the expected value
E(X) of every desirable gamble X; however, the expectation operator is not enough to completely specify the set of desirable
gambles.
Whenan impreciseprobabilisticmodel isdescribedequivalentlyusingacoherent lowerprevisionora credal set, theabove
consistency properties will obtain different forms. But while there is a unique correspondence between sets of desirable
gambles inK and coherent lower previsions onK , there are in general several credal sets which correspond to the same set
of desirable gambles onK . The reason is that credal sets contain linear previsions which are defined on the setL , which is
in general larger thanK , so a set of linear previsions onK can have several extensions toL . This makes it difficult to apply
adjoints of the operators in T to credal sets. For this reason we will instead of a credal setM take its restrictionMK toK ,
which on K coincides withM and besides, it belongs to the dual space of K which allows the adjoints of operators in T
to be applied to it. This is done as follows. Let T be a linear operator and P a linear prevision onK . Then the adjoint of T is
the operator T∗ defined on the set of linear functionals onK with T∗P(X) = P(TX) =: PT(X). For every set of operators T
and every credal setMK onK we then define
MK T = T ∗MK := {T∗P : T ∈ T , P ∈ MK } = {PT : T ∈ T , P ∈ MK }.
The following proposition provides equivalent conditions for consistency when instead of with set of almost desirable
gambles a probabilistic model is described by a lower prevision or a credal set. It is analogous to [5, Theorem 2] where
similar conditions are given for sets of related operators modelling symmetry.
Proposition 1. Let T ⊆ S (K ) be a set of Markov operators, D ⊂ K a set of desirable gambles, P the corresponding lower
prevision onK andMK = MK (P) its credal set onK . The following statements are equivalent:
(i) D is consistent with T ;
(ii) for every X ∈ K and every T ∈ T , P(TX) ≥ P(X);
(iii) MK T ⊆ coMK T ⊆ MK , where co denotes the convex hull.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii): Suppose thatD is consistent withT . Take any gamble X and letμ be a real number such that X−μ ∈ D .
Using consistency, linearity of T and its invariance for constant gambles, we obtain that T(X − μ) = TX − μ ∈ D . Thus we
have that {μ : X − μ ∈ D} ⊆ {μ : TX − μ ∈ D}. By definition of lower prevision (1) we then have that
P(X) = sup{μ : X − μ ∈ D} ≤ sup{μ : TX − μ ∈ D} = P(TX).
(ii) ⇒ (i): Assume first that P(TX) ≥ P(X) for every T ∈ T and let X ∈ D . Then P(TX) ≥ P(X) ≥ 0 which implies that
TX ∈ D for every T ∈ T .
(ii)⇐⇒(iii): Assuming (ii), we have the following equivalences for every T ∈ T :
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P(X) ⇔ MK T ⊆ MK ,
which is equivalent to MK T = ⋃T∈T MK T ⊆ MK . Since MK is a convex set, it always contains the convex hull of
MK T . 
For short, we will describe an imprecise probability model given by its coherent lower prevision, credal set or set of
desirable gambles as consistent with a set of operators if any of the above equivalent conditions is satisfied.
Let us now give equivalent definitions for dominance of a set of Markov operators.
Proposition 2. Let T ⊆ S (K ) be a set of Markov operators, D ⊂ K a set of desirable gambles, P the corresponding lower
prevision onK andMK = MK (P) its credal set onK . The following statements are equivalent:
(i) D dominates T ;
(ii) for every X ∈ K we have thatminT∈T P(TX) ≤ P(X);
(iii) co(MK T ) ⊇ MK .
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii): Suppose that D dominates T , which is equivalent to
{X ∈ K : TX ∈ D ∀T ∈ T } ⊆ D.
Notice also that
min
T∈T P(TX) = sup{μ : TX − μ ∈ D ∀T ∈ T }.
Using these we have that for every X ∈ K
{μ : TX − μ ∈ D ∀T ∈ T } = {μ : T(X − μ) ∈ D ∀T ∈ T } ⊆ {μ : X − μ ∈ D},
which implies minT∈T P(TX) ≤ P(X).
(ii) ⇒ (i): Take any X ∈ D . We have that minT∈T P(TX) ≤ P(X) < 0, which means that P(TX) < 0 for some T ∈ T ,
and thus TX ∈ D .
(ii)⇐⇒(iii): We have the following equivalences:
minT∈T P(TX) ≤ P(X) ⇔ minT∈T minP∈MK P(TX) ≤ minP∈MK P(X)
⇔ minPT∈MKT PT(X) ≤ minP∈MK P(X) ⇔ co(MK T ) ⊇ MK . 
Again we will say that a probabilistic model given either by its lower prevision, set of desirable gambles or credal set on
K , and that satisfies any of the above equivalent conditions, dominates T .
The following equivalent conditions hold for probabilistic models that are generated by T , i.e. both dominate T and are
consistent with it.
Proposition 3. Let T ⊆ S (K ) be a set of Markov operators, D ⊂ K a set of desirable gambles, P the corresponding lower
prevision onK andMK = MK (P) its credal set onK . The following statements are equivalent:
(i) D is generated by T ;
(ii) for every X ∈ K we have thatminT∈T P(TX) = P(X);
(iii) co(MK T ) = MK .
The sets with the propertyMT = M are known from the study of imprecise Markov chains [20] where they are called
invariant sets of probabilities.
The following proposition clarifies the consistency properties when the sets of desirability preserving operators are
induced by lower previsions using (7) and (8).
Proposition 4. Let P be some coherent lower prevision onK and TP the corresponding set of (constant) desirability preserving
operators. Let P′ be another coherent lower prevision. Then
(i) P′ is consistent with TP if and only if P′ ≤ P;
(ii) P′ dominates TP if and only if P′ ≥ P;
(iii) P is the only coherent lower prevision generated by TP .
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Proof. Since TPX are constant gambles, we have that P
′(TPX) = P(X) for every coherent lower prevision P′.
(i) Let P′ be consistent with T (P), or equivalently, for every TP ∈ T (P) we have that P′(X) ≤ P′(TPX) = P(X), which is
equivalent with P′ being dominated by all P ∈ M (P), and this is equivalent with P′ ≤ P.
(ii) Let P′ dominate TP , which is equivalent to minTP∈TP P′(TPX) ≤ P′(X), where the left hand side of this inequality is
clearly equal to P(X), and therefore P ≤ P′.
(iii) Is an immediate consequence of the previous two properties. 
In Propositions 1, 2 and 3 we assumed that the domains of the lower previsions P are the same as the domains K of
the sets of operators T . But in the sequel we will say that a coherent lower prevision defined on a larger domain, sayH , is
consistent (dominates, is generated) with T if its restriction toK has the corresponding property.
4.3. Constructing new coherent lower previsions using sets of Markov operators
Definition 5. LetK be a linear space of gambles, T ⊆ S (K ) and P a coherent lower prevision onK . Define:
PT (X) = min
T
P(TX) (9)
for every X ∈ K .
Proposition 5. If P is a coherent lower prevision then PT is also a coherent lower prevision.
Proof. BecauseK is a linear space, we must prove that PT satisfies (P1)–(P3).
(P1) Let Y = infX X · 1X . Since Y is a constant gamble, every Markov operator T maps it to itself. Further we have that
X ≥ Y , whence by monotonicity of Markov operators, TX ≥ TY = Y follows, and further, monotonicity of P implies
that P(TX) ≥ P(TY) = P(Y) = infX X . This inequality is preserved when minima are taken and this implies that
(P1) holds for PT .
(P2) follows directly from positive homogeneity of both Markov operators and coherent lower previsions.
(P3) Take any X and Y ∈ K . We have
PT (X + Y) = minT P(T(X + Y))
= minT P(TX + TY)
≥ minT P(TX) + P(TY)
≥ minT P(TX) + minT P(TY)
= PT (X) + PT (Y). 
The following proposition is an easy consequence of definitions.
Proposition 6. Let P be a coherent lower prevision onK and T ⊆ S (K ). Then
(i) P is consistent with T if and only if PT ≥ P;
(ii) P dominates T if and only if PT ≤ P;
(iii) P is generated by T if and only if PT = P.
Proposition 7. Let P be a coherent lower prevision onK and T ⊆ S (K ). Then
(i) if P is consistent with T , then PT is consistent with T ;
(ii) if P dominates T , then PT dominates T .
Proof. (i) Suppose that P is consistent with T . We have:
PT (TX) = min
T ′∈T P(T
′TX) ≥ P(TX) ≥ min
T∈T P(TX) = PT (X),
for every T ∈ T , and thus PT is consistent with T .
(ii) Let P dominate T . Then we have:
min
T∈T PT (TX) = minT∈T minT ′∈T P(T
′TX) ≤ min
T∈T P(TX) = PT (X),
which means that PT also dominates T . 
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In the following we will make use of the sequence of lower previsions constructed in the following way. Let P be some
coherent lower prevision onK . Then the sequence {Pn}n∈N∪{0} is constructed recursively with
P0 = P; Pn+1 = (Pn)T for every n ≥ 0. (10)
Lemma 1. Let P be a coherent lower prevision onK ,T ⊆ S (K ) and {Pn}n∈N∪{0} the sequence constructed with (10). Then
(i) if P is consistent with T , then P∞ = limn→∞ Pn exists and is the smallest (the least committal) coherent lower prevision
generated by T and dominating P;
(ii) if P dominatesT , then P∞ = limn→∞ Pn exists and is the largest (themost committal) coherent lower prevision generated
by T and dominated by P.
Proof. It is an immediate consequence of the construction and Proposition 6 that both limits exist and that in the case of (i)
P∞ ≥ P and in the case of (ii) P∞ ≤ P. It is also clear that in both cases P∞ is generated by T .
To see that they are the smallest and the largest one respectively, note that the transformation P 
→ PT is monotone, i.e.
if P ≤ P′ then PT ≤ P′T . Now suppose for instance that for the case of (i) P′ ≥ P is a coherent lower prevision generated by
T . Monotonicity then implies that P′ = P′∞ ≥ P∞, hence, P∞ is indeed the smallest lower prevision generated by T and
greater than P. A similar reasoning can be used to show that for the case of (ii) P∞ is the largest coherent lower prevision
generated by T , smaller than P. 
The following corollary is now immediate.
Corollary 1. For every set T ⊆ S (K ), the set of coherent lower previsions generated by T is non-empty. Moreover, if P is the
vacuous lower prevision, i.e. P(X) = minx∈X X(x), then P∞ is the smallest coherent lower prevision generated by T .
When the natural extension of P∞ is considered for the vacuous lower prevision P onK it is clearly the smallest coherent
lower prevision on the set of all gamblesL generated by T .
Definition 6. The least committal (minimal) lower prevision on the set of all gambles L generated by a set of operators
T ⊆ S (K ) will be denoted by ET or just E, when the corresponding set of operators will be clear from the context. Its
credal set, which is then the largest credal set generated by T will be denoted withM (T ).
In general there is nomost committal (largest) coherent lowerprevision generatedbyT ; however, the following sufficient
condition holds.
Proposition 8. Let T ⊆ S(K ) and suppose that for some T ∈ T the limit limn→∞ PTn = Q exists for all linear previsions P
onK and is independent of P. Then there exists the unique largest coherent lower prevision onK generated by T .
Proof. Define PT := P{T}. Clearly, T ∈ T implies PT ≥ PT . Let P be a coherent lower prevision on K generated by T ,
P ∈ M (P), and T ∈ T be such that limn→∞ PTn = Q . Then PTn ≥ Pn = P for every n ≥ 0, which implies thatQ ≥ P. More-
over, Q clearly dominates T since QT = T and therefore minT ′∈T Q(T ′X) ≤ Q(TX) = Q(X) for every X ∈ K . By Lemma 1
thenQ∞ is themaximal coherent lowerprevisiongeneratedbyT anddominatedbyQ . But, aswehave shown, every coherent
lower prevision generated byT is dominated by Q . Hence, Q∞ is themaximal coherent lower prevision generated byT . 
Corollary 2. If a set of operators T ⊆ S(K ) contains a constant operator TQ for some linear prevision Q then there exists the
unique largest coherent lower prevision onK generated by T .
Proof. Clearly Q = PTQ = limn→∞ PTnQ for every linear prevision P on K . The existence of the unique smallest credal set
then follows by Proposition 8. 
Example 1. Consider the set of gambles onX with three elements. A gamble is then denoted by X = (x, y, z). Assume the
following desirability preserving operators:
(i) if (x, y, z) ∈ D then (z, y, x) ∈ D , which is a way to express symmetry between the first and the third element inX ;








∈ D , expressing a conditional model on the first two states;









∈ D , which means that obtaining the average of a desirable gamble
with certainty is desirable as well.
Because the set of operators contains an operator mapping to constant gambles, we can start with the linear prevision
P(x, y, z) = x+y+z
3
and then using the sequence (10) calculate the most committal lower prevision generated by and
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therefore also themost committal one consistent with these operators. The resulting lower prevision is the one given by the
following assessments
P(1, 0, 0) = 2
9
, P(1, 1, 0) = 2
3
, P(0, 1, 0) = 1
3
P(1, 0, 1) = 13
27
, P(0, 0, 1) = 2
9
, P(0, 1, 1) = 2
3
The assessments for other gambles are obtained as lower expectations with respect to the corresponding lower probability.
4.4. Modelling risk and uncertainty aversion
One of themotivations for the use ofmodels applying credal sets ismodelling of uncertainty aversion. Themodel proposed
by Gilbao and Schmeidler [9] suggests that the uncertainty in prior probability measure should be modelled by a closed and
convex set of priors C , which corresponds to our notion of a credal set. The preference relation given by









(cf. [17]) is shown there to satisfy the conditions of uncertainty aversion. The utility function u is then in the role to simulta-
neouslymodel the decisionmaker’s attitude towards risk. However, as follows from considerations in Section 3, risk aversion
with respect to a probability model p is also possible to be modelled with credal sets that are closed with respect to Jeffrey’s
rule [3,19,24]. One of the arguments formodelling risk aversion in this way is that it allows separating attitudes towards risk
from attitudes towards wealth, which would then only remain to be modelled with utility functions [3], while the attitudes
towards risk would be modelled through the corresponding imprecise probabilistic models. As shown in Section 3, this
means that the corresponding sets of desirable gambles must be closed for conditional expectations.
The approach with Markov operators now allows a very efficient way to combining the models of risk and uncertainty
when both are modelled with credal sets. Let C be the set of priors which reflects the decision maker’s beliefs about the
probability distribution. A decision maker that is risk averse should therefore always prefer a less risky gamble, and as he
allows all members of C to be candidates for the true probability model, it would be reasonable to prefer any conditional
expectation Ep(X|B) to X , where p ∈ C andB is any partition ofX . The setTC of operators of this form then represents the
corresponding desirability preserving rules. Thus the credal setsM such that coMTC = M are the models representing
these preference relations.
Such a consistency condition should of course be understood in a similar sense as is concavity of utility function in the
classical expected utility models, which is a general requirement for risk aversion. Additional analysis is then needed to
choose the right model. We should note however that the set of operators TC satisfies the conditions of Corollary 2, since it
contains the expectation operators Ep, where p ∈ C . This implies the existence of the smallest set consistentwith these rules,
which could be interpreted as the least risk averse consistent model. In the case where C consists of a single probability,
this is of course the risk neutral model.
Example 2. Consider the set of gambles on the set X with three elements. Suppose that belief about the probability

















, |A| = 2.



























. It is an elementary exercise to see that
the most committal lower prevision that models preferences on the set L (X ) that satisfy risk aversion with respect to all

















, |A| = 2.
5. Extensions
Consider a set of operators T that is defined on a linear space K ⊆ L . An extension T¯ of T to some linear space
H ⊃ K is a set of operators on H such that T = {T¯|K : T¯ ∈ T¯ }. By definition, the behaviour of the extension T¯ on
the original spaceK is the same as the behaviour of T . In this section we will show that this is mostly also true when the
corresponding probabilistic models are considered. This means that behavioural implications of themodels that correspond
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to the extensions are the same onK as those of the models corresponding to the original set of operators. We show this in
the following subsection.
In Section 5.2 we study a particular case of extensions that correspond to marginal extensions, which present one of the
most important extension procedures in the theory of imprecise probabilities. We prove a theorem which corresponds to
themarginal extension theorem for sets of Markov operators.
5.1. The basic extension theorem
In this subsection we prove that given a set of operators T on the domain K and an arbitrary extension T¯ to a larger
domain, say H , then every coherent lower prevision P generated by T has a corresponding coherent lower prevision on
H that is generated by T¯ . The converse is of course also true, since every lower prevision that is generated by T¯ is also
generated by T , when restricted toK .
Proposition 9. Let T be a set of Markov operators on a linear spaceK ⊆ L and T¯ an arbitrary extension toH ⊇ K . If P is a
coherent lower prevision onH that dominates T¯ then its restriction toK dominates T .
Proof. Suppose that P dominates T¯ . By definition thenminT∈T¯ P(TX) ≤ P(X) for every X ∈ H , and in particular, for every
X ∈ K , minT∈T¯ P(TX) = minT∈T P(TX) ≤ P(X), which means that P|K dominates T . 
Lemma 2. Let T be a set of Markov operators on K and T¯ an arbitrary extension to H . If P is a coherent lower prevision
consistent with T then its natural extension E toH is consistent with T¯ .
Proof. Consider ET¯ definedwith (9).We have that ET¯ |K = PT ≥ P, by Proposition 6, and since E is the smallest coherent
lower prevision on H dominating P on K , it must hold that ET¯ ≥ E, which is by Proposition 6 equivalent to E being
consistent with T¯ . 
Theorem 1. Let T be a set of Markov operators on a linear space K ⊆ L and T¯ an extension to H . Then for every coherent
lower prevision P onK generated by T there exists a coherent extension P˜ toH that is generated by T¯ .
Proof. Let P be a coherent lower prevision onK generated by T . By Lemma 2 its natural extension E is consistent with T¯ .
By Lemma 1, the limit E∞ = limn→∞ En, where E0 = E and En+1 = (En)T¯ , is generated by T¯ . Clearly, En|K = P for every
n ≥ 0 and therefore also E∞|K = P. Hence, E∞ is an extension of P and is generated by T¯ . 
5.2. Generalised marginal extensions
Another important extension in the theory of lower previsions is the marginal extension (see [13,22]). We have the
following situation. Let B be a partition of X , K a set of B-measurable gambles and P a lower prevision on K . Using the
natural extension, the lower prevision P can be uniquely extended to a lower prevision on the setL (B) of allB-measurable
gambles, therefore we may assume thatK = L (B).
Further, for every B ∈ Bwe assume a conditional lower prevision P(·|B). The value P(X|B) is interpreted as the supremum
buying price of the gamble X if it is assumed that B occurs. The conditional lower prevision P(·|B) is then the operator that




The conditional lower prevision is assumed to be separately coherent which, in the case when the domain is a linear space,
is equivalent to
(C1) P(X|B) ≥ infx∈B X(x) for every X ∈ K and B ∈ B;
(C2) P(λX|B) = λP(X|B) for every λ > 0 and X ∈ K ;
(C3) P(X + Y |B) ≥ P(X|B) + P(Y |B) for every X, Y ∈ K .
Separate coherence implies the existence of the credal set
M (P(·|B)) = {P(·|B) : P(X|B) ≥ P(X|B)}
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where P(·|B) ∈ M (P(·|B)) for every B ∈ B, is then a conditional expectation operator, and separate coherence of P(·|B)
then implies that, for every X ∈ L
P(X|B) = min
P(·|B)≥P(·|B) P(X|B).
Thus, every conditional lower prevision can equivalently be represented with a set of conditional expectation (linear) oper-
ators, which are projections from a space of more general gambles to the space ofB-measurable gambles. We now state the
classical version of the marginal extension theorem [22, 6.7.2].
Theorem 2 (Marginal extension theorem). Let P be a coherent lower prevision on a set K of B-measurable gambles and
P(·|B) a separately coherent lower prevision on an arbitrary set of gambles H . Then there are extensions of P and P(·|B) that
are coherent. The minimal coherent extensions are E and E(·|B), where each E(·|B) is the natural extension of P(·|B) to L , E is
defined for allB-measurable gambles as the natural extension of P, and E is extended to L by E(X) = E(E(X|B)). The minimal
coherent extension satisfies E(X) = P(P(X|B)) whenever the right hand side is defined.
In terms of sets of operators we have the following situation. A set T ⊆ S(K ) is given, where K ⊆ L . Further we
have a set of projections R from H ⊇ K to K , i.e. RX = X for every R ∈ R and every X ∈ K . This part is slightly less
general than its counterpart in the Walley’s theorem, where the set R would map to a space containingK . There this does
not present a problem since using the natural extension the lower prevision P can be uniquely extended to the space of
all B-measurable gambles, while it is much less obvious how to extend a set of more general operators to a larger domain
in such a universal way. But also the part that extends P to the space of all B-measurable gambles seems one of the least
problematic considerations in theWalley’s theorem. Another seemingly less general assumption here is thatH contains all
B-measurable gambles. But this assumption could aswell be adopted in theWalley’s theorem, since clearly, every extension
of P(·|B) is trivially defined as P(X|B) being equal to the constant value that X takes on B for anyB-measurable gamble X .
Now, every R ∈ R is a monotone linear operator H → K such that RX = X for every X ∈ K . Under the above
assumptions, the set T R ⊆ S(H ) can be formed that mapsH to K and coincides with T on K . The following theorem
implies that ETR satisfies the properties of marginal extension. The set of operators T R takes the role of E restricted toH
in Walley’s theorem, and ETR then corresponds to its extension to the whole of L .
Theorem 3. Let K be a linear subspace of a linear space of gambles H and R a set of Markov operators H → K such that
RX = X for every R ∈ R and every X ∈ K , and let T be any set of Markov operators on K . Further let P be a coherent lower
prevision onH . Then
(i) if P is consistent with both T and R then it is consistent with T R;
(ii) if P dominates both T and R then it dominates T R;
(iii) P is generated by both T and R if and only if it is generated by T R.
Proof. First we notice that PTR = (PR)T . Now suppose that P is consistent with both T and R. By Proposition 6 we
have that PTR = (PR)T ≥ (P)T ≥ P, which by the same proposition implies that PTR is consistent with T R, and thus
proves (i). If P dominates both T andR, we use the same proposition to obtain PTR = (PR)T ≤ (P)T ≤ P, which shows
that P then dominates T R, proving (ii).
To prove (iii), it only remains to show that a coherent lower prevision P generated by T R is also generated by both T
andR. That it is generated by T follows from the fact that T R is an extension of T . To see that P is generated byR, we take
some X ∈ H and obtain
PR(X) = min
R∈R P(RX) = minR∈R PT (RX) = minR∈R minT∈T P(TRX) = PTR(X) = P(X),
where the second equality follows from P being generated by T and the last one by it being generated by T R. 
The next corollary clarifies how the above theorem relates tomarginal extensions. Asmentioned before it covers a slightly
less general version where the domain of the unconditional lower prevision is the whole space of B-measurable gambles,
which in Walley’s theorem can only be a subset of it.
Corollary 3. Let P be a coherent lower prevision on the space of all B-measurable gambles and P(·|B) a jointly coherent
conditional lower prevision on some linear space H of gambles that contains all B-measurable gambles. Then define T = TP
(cf. (8)) andR = {P(·|B) : P(X|B) ≥ P(X|B) for all X ∈ H }. The minimal coherent lower prevision E generated byT R is then
the minimal coherent extension defined in Theorem 2.
Proof. By Theorem 3 E is generated by both T andR. Being generated by T implies only that it coincides with P on the set
ofB-measurable gambles. Being generated by R means the following. By Proposition 6(iii) we have that ER = E, which in
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this case means that for every X ∈ H we have that
E(X) = min
P(·|B)∈R P(P(X|B)) = P(P(X|B)).
Therefore, E is the minimal extension of P(P(·|B)) toL , and this is exactly the marginal extension of P and P(·|B). 
6. Independent products
Another important method of extending precise and imprecise probabilities is by forming independent products. We
remain in finite spaces, which means that most of the technical measurability considerations are trivial. Given probability
measures p and q on separate measurable spaces (X ,A ) and (Y ,B) respectively, the independent product probability
measure p × q is the unique probability on (X × Y ,A × B) that factorises on the product sets:
(p × q)(A × B) = p(A)q(B).
6.1. The spaceL (X × Y ) as a tensor product
The key consideration used to forming independent products is the extension of the bilinear map (p, q) 
→ p q (the
product), defined on a product of two linear spaces, to a linear map defined on a new linear space (X × Y ,A × B). Such
constructions in general often make use of tensor products of linear spaces (see [14] for general theory of tensor products
and [8, 4.17.1] for the definition of product measure with tensor products). In the continuation we explicitly demonstrate
the isomorphism between the linear spaceL (X × Y ) and the tensor productL (X ) ⊗ L (Y ).
We first repeat the most basic facts about tensor products of vector spaces. Given a pair of arbitrary vector spacesK and
H , their tensor product K ⊗ H is the vector space constructed in the following way. Let F(K × H ) be the free vector
space overK ×H , i.e. the vector space with the basis equal toK ×H . The tensor product is then defined as
K ⊗H := F(K ×H )/R,
where R is the vector space defined through relations
(x + x′) × y ∼ x × y + x′ × y,
x × (y + y′) ∼ x × y + x × y′,
a(x × y) ∼ (ax) × y ∼ x × (ay).
Every element ofK ⊗H is then a linear combination of a finite number of elements x ⊗ ywhich are called decomposable
tensors. Such a linear combination is then of course, because of the above equivalences, not unique. However, if {b1, . . . , bm}
and {c1, . . . , cn} are respectively the bases ofK andH , then the tensors bi ⊗ cj are linearly independent and form the basis
ofK ⊗H . Thus,
dim(K ⊗H ) = dim(K ) · dim(H ).
Themost important reason for the use of tensor product is the following universal property. For every bilinearmap : K ×
H → V to an arbitrary vector space V there is a unique linear map φ : K ⊗H → V such that φ(x ⊗ y) = (x, y).
Now let K = L (X ) and H = L (Y ). The sets {1{x} : x ∈ X } and {1{y} : y ∈ Y } are the bases of L (X ) and L (Y )
respectively. Clearly there is aone-to-onecorrespondencebetween theelements1{(x,y)} and1{x}⊗1{y}. Therefore,L (X ×Y )
can be identified with the tensor product L (X ) ⊗ L (Y ). Let X ∈ L (X ) and Y ∈ L (Y ). Then their tensor product is
defined as
(X ⊗ Y)(x, y) = X(x)Y(y).
The spacesL (X ) andL (Y ) can be considered subspaces ofL (X )⊗L (Y ) by identifying each element X ∈ L (X )with
X ⊗ 1Y and similarly for the elements of L (Y ). As real valued maps this identification is nothing more than identifying
the map X ∈ L (X ) with the map X˜ ∈ L (X × Y ) such that X˜(x, y) = X(x).
Tensor products can be extended to linear operators on the corresponding vector spaces. Let S : K → K ′ and T : H →
H ′ be such linear operators. Their tensor product is then the unique linear operator T ⊗ S : K ⊗H → K ′ ⊗H ′ such that
(T ⊗ S)(X ⊗ Y) = TX ⊗ SY . (11)
In the matrix form the tensor product T ⊗ S, also called Kronecker product of matrices, is defined as follows. Let T = (tij)
and S = (skl) be two matrices. Then
T ⊗ S = (tijS),
i.e. it is the matrix constructed from T , such that every element tij is replaced with the matrix tijS.
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The following important general result holds for the tensor product of linear operators.
Proposition 10. Let T1 : K1 → K2, T2 : K2 → K3, S1 : H1 → H2 and S2 : H2 → H3 be linear operators then
(T2 ⊗ S2)(T1 ⊗ S1) = (T2T1) ⊗ (S2S1).
In the special case, where the linear operators are positive linear functionals with norm 1 (linear previsions), say P and
Q , the equation (11) becomes
(P ⊗ Q)(X ⊗ Y) = P(X)Q(Y).
In particular P⊗Q is the unique linear prevision such that (P⊗Q)(1A×B) = (P⊗Q)(1A ⊗1B) = P(1A)Q(1B) = P(A)Q(B),
which is exactly the independent product of the corresponding probability measures P and Q .
6.2. Tensor product of sets of operators as independent product
Products of lower previsions are used to extend two or more lower previsions defined on sets of gambles on separate
underlying spaces to a lower prevision on a set of gambles on the product of the underlying spaces. The usual requirement
for a product is that it extends the given lower previsions, called marginals. This means that the domains of marginals are
contained in the domain of the product and that the product coincideswith themarginals on their domains. The construction
of a product is not unique in general and usually it is required to satisfy some form of independence. In literature the most
commonly used products are natural extension, independent natural extension and strong product (see [6,7,22]).
The strong product of lower previsions P and Q (also called independent lower envelope in [22] or type-I product in [6]) is
the most committal product lower prevision whose credal set contains the independent products of all linear previsions in
M (P) andM (Q) respectively.Wewill denote this product by P⊗Q for the reasons that will be clarified in the continuation.
Thus, we have
M (P ⊗ Q) = co{P ⊗ Q : P ∈ M (P),Q ∈ M (Q)} =: M (P) ⊗M (Q).
The strong product has a direct extension, which we define next, to a product of more general sets of operators, and this is
not the case with other types of products, where more specific properties of lower previsions are needed that do not have
clear counterparts for general linear operators. Take for instance the notion of the lower expectation with respect to a set of
linear previsions, which is a way how lower previsions are constructed, and it does not extend to a known corresponding
object related to sets of general linear operators. For this reason in the sequel the independent product will denote the strong
product.
Given two sets of operators T andS we define
T ⊗ S = {T ⊗ S : T ∈ T , S ∈ S }.
Nowwefirst consider the case of the sets of operatorsTP andTQ as defined by (8). Consider the tensor product TP⊗TQ where
P and Q are linear previsions. We have (TP ⊗ TQ )(X ⊗ Y) = TP(X) ⊗ TQ (Y) = P(X)1X ⊗ Q(Y)1Y = P(X)Q(Y)1X×Y =
TP⊗Q (X ⊗ Y). Thus, TP ⊗ TQ is the operator corresponding to P ⊗ Q onL (X × Y ). It follows that
TP ⊗ TQ = TP⊗Q .
For this reason we will call T ⊗ S the independent product of the sets of operators T and S .
LetM andN be credal sets. ThenM ⊗N is the set of all convex combinations of the elements of the form P ×Q where
P ∈ M and Q ∈ N . The set (M ⊗N )(T ⊗S ) is then the convex set generated by the elements of the form PT ⊗QSwhich
equals to the setMT ⊗ N S . Thus, we have the following identity:
(M ⊗ N )(T ⊗ S ) = MT ⊗ N S . (12)
It follows from the definition of the tensor product of setsM and N that it is the convex closure of the set generated by
the elements P ⊗ Q where P ∈ M and Q ∈ N , and this set clearly also contains all the elements of the form P˜ ⊗ Q˜ where
P˜ ∈ coM and Q˜ ∈ coN . Thus,
M ⊗ N = coM ⊗ coN . (13)
Proposition 11. LetM be a credal set generated by T ⊗S andMX andMY its marginals. ThenMX is generated by T and
MY is generated by S .
Proof. The assumption thatM is generated by T ⊗ S implies that
min
T⊗S∈T⊗S EM(T ⊗ S)Z = EMZ. (14)
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Therefore,
min
T∈T EMX TX = minT∈T EMTX ⊗ 1Y
= min
T⊗S∈T⊗S EM(T ⊗ S)(X ⊗ 1Y )
= EM(X ⊗ 1Y )
= EMX X,
by (14). Thus,MX is generated by T . The same arguments can be used to prove thatMY is generated by S . 
Proposition 12. LetM be a credal set that is independent product of its marginals:
M = MX ⊗MY .
ThenM is generated by T ⊗ S if and only if the marginals are generated by T and S respectively.
Among other, this means that every pair of credal sets generated by T andS respectively has an extension to a product
set that is generated by T ⊗ S , which is analogous to the result in Theorem 1.
Proof. If M is generated by T ⊗ S then it follows from Proposition 11 that MX and MY are generated by T and S
respectively.
Now suppose that the marginals are generated by T andS respectively. Using Proposition 3(iii) and identities (12) and
(13), we obtain
min
T⊗S∈T⊗S EM(T ⊗ S)Z = EM(T⊗S )Z = E(MX⊗MY )(T⊗S )Z
= EMXT⊗MYS Z = Eco(MXT )⊗co(MYS )Z = EMX⊗MY Z = EMZ.
Thus,M is generated by T ⊗ S , as required. 
Itwouldnot be reasonable to expect that every set generatedby the independentproductT ⊗S wouldbean independent
product of its marginals. For a counterexample consider the case where T = {idX } and S = {idY }, where idX denotes
the identity operator: idX (x) = x. Then T ⊗ S = {idX×Y } and every credal set M on X × Y is then generated by
T ⊗ S and its marginals are generated by T and S , as well. But, of course, not every such set is an independent product
of its marginals, so this property must be additionally required. Although, the following important result holds.
Theorem 4.
M (T ⊗ S ) = M (T ) ⊗M (S ).
whereM (O) denotes the maximal credal set generated by O , for any set of Markov operators O .
Proof. We generate the sequence of credal setsMn(O), where O stands for T ,S and T ⊗ S respectively, as follows. Let
M0 be the set of all linear previsions on the corresponding domain and letMn+1(O) = co [Mn(O)O]. Clearly,
M (O) = ⋂
n∈N
Mn(O).
It also easy to see that every probability on a product space can be expressed as a convex combination of the independent
products of marginal probabilities:M0(T ⊗ S ) = M0(T ) ⊗M0(S ). It only remains to prove the inductive step to show
that
Mn(T ⊗ S ) = Mn(T ) ⊗Mn(S ). (15)
Assume that (15) holds for n. Using (12) and (13) we then obtain
Mn+1(T ⊗ S ) = co[Mn(T ⊗ S )(T ⊗ S )]
= co[(Mn(T ) ⊗Mn(S ))(T ⊗ S )]
= Mn(T )T ⊗Mn(S )S
= co(Mn(T )T ) ⊗ co(Mn(S )S )
= Mn+1(T ) ⊗Mn+1(S ).
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Hence, (15) holds for n+1 aswell and therefore for every non-negative integer n. The setM (T ⊗S ) is thus the set generated
by all convex combinations of the elements P ⊗ Q where P ∈ Mn(T ) and Q ∈ Mn(S ) for every n ∈ Nwhich is exactly the
independent productM (T ) ⊗M (S ). 
7. Conclusions
The contribution of this paper is the development of a general model using sets of Markov operators that preserve desir-
ability of gambles. As themotivating exampleswe used conditional expectations as operators reducing risk and permutation
operators which can be used to express symmetry of beliefs.
The sets of desirability preserving operators can either be used to form new desirable gambles from given ones, and
so completing partially specified sets of almost desirable gambles; or as a complete set of rules that allow constructing
compatible imprecise probability models. Although the main motivations were reducing risk and expressing symmetry of
beliefs, our model does not assume any specific interpretation; moreover, we have argued that any desirability preserving
transformation that is a linear operator is necessarily a Markov operator. We defined the consistency properties between
imprecise probability models and sets of Markov operators which allow either checking compatibility between existing
imprecise probability model and a set of operators or constructing such compatible models.
We have also shown that sets of Markov operators on linear spaces can be extended to larger spaces; moreover, the
imprecise probability models compatible with sets of operators can be extended to models that are compatible with the
extended sets of operators. As specific types of extensionswe analysedmarginal extensions and extension to product spaces.
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